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Summary: The eastward enlargement of the Euro area entails significant implications 
for the accession candidates in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the existing Euro sys-
tem and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The present analysis 
assesses the challenges and critical aspects in monetary policy modeling with special 
emphasis to enlargement. The focus is on the difficulty of implementing a unique cur-
rency policy in view or growing heterogeneity within the enlarged monetary union, and 
secondly – the issue of the voting mechanism within the ECB. When analyzing those 
two issues, it is conclusive that the difficulties for the ECB and the current Euro zone 
members will increase. For the enlarged Euro zone, which is becoming more divergent, 
it will be very hard to find adequate recipes to meet the needs and requirements of all. 
The big question is: whether centralisation of monetary policy is a sustainable and supe-
rior solution?  
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Introduction 
 
The enlargement of the EU with ten new member states in May 2004 and two 
more in January 2007 has attracted much academic attention, especially with 
regard to the probable implications on further enlargement of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU).  
It is assumed that for the new members, the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries (CEECs) in particular, adoption of the euro as a legal tender may 
invoke inflationary pressures for the common currency. The critical issue is how 
reshaping of decision-making procedures of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
throughout the course of the EMU enlargement, will effect market expectations, 
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particularly bearing in mind the uncertainty linked with the increasing number of 
actors within the ECB and their voting behavior. 
 
The EMU enlargement is taking place at the time when the Union faces institu-
tional and functional adjustments in the implementation of monetary and fiscal 
policies in the EMU. Whilst the European Central Bank (ECB) does not adjust 
its monetary policy in order to address economic challenges faced by individual 
member states, fiscal policies are tailored to national frameworks and, although 
limited by the prescribed criteria as regards the budget deficit and public debt, 
are often not properly coordinated (Cohen, 2008). Consequently, asymmetries 
between the centralized monetary policy and different inflation rates in the Eu-
rozone are likely to occur. 
In this context, the EMU enlargement could additionally intensify 
asymmetries within the Eurozone bearing in mind the heterogeneous economic 
structures of new EU member states, namely from the Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). Thus there is a motive, at least in theory, to slow down the acces-
sion of new member states to the Eurozone until a higher level of economic con-
vergence within the EU-27 is reached.  
According to the acquis, the new EU member states are legally obliged 
to adopt the euro and are currently undergoing the accession phase. That gives 
rise to certain important questions: 1) from the perspective of the new member 
states, the question of pace of transition towards the single European currency 
and 2) from the perspective of the current Eurozone member states, a dilemma is 
whether and as to what extent the monetary policy would have to be modified in 
order to recognize the needs and specific circumstances in new member states.   
This paper summarizes the essence of EMU enlargement and its impli-
cations for the single monetary policy, with a special overview of reform of the 
ECB decision-making process in view of the Eurozone expansion.  
 
 
1. The Eurozone enlargement  
 
The first decade of euro was characterized by the biggest enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) to ten new Member States in May 2004 and another two 
in January 2007. The total number of Member States rose from 15 to 27, 
whereas the number of inhabitants rose to nearly 500 million. However, the eco-
nomic effect of the enlargement was less impressive although the overall GDP 
rose by less than 10 percent bearing in mind that the “new Member States”
1 
GDP per capita was mostly below the EU average.  
                                                 
1 The term “old EU member states” is used for the EU-15, i.e. the EU composition until the fifth 
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Since 1999, when the euro became the common currency of 11 EU Member 
states, the Eurozone has expanded four times: Greece joined in 2001, Slovenia in 
2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008 and Slovakia in 2009. Ten years following its 
introduction, the euro is used by 16 EU Member States and it is expected that 
this number will increase considerably over the medium-term.  
Currently, 11 EU Member States - characterized by significant differ-
ences in the legal status as regards its adoption and the degree of convergence - 
do not use the euro. Denmark and UK enjoy the special status based on the “opt 
out clauses” providing for the degree of convergence for entering the Eurozone 
to be considered only if these countries were to request it. The remaining states 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Sweden) are “Member States with the derogation”. In other words 
they are legally obliged to adopt the euro. At the same time, the length and the 
optimum pace of accession of new EU member states to EMU is considered by 
the pertinent European institutions on individual merit.   
It is envisaged that the EU enlargement will continue in the years to 
come, although at a slower pace. At the moment, three countries have the candi-
date status: Turkey as of 1999, Croatia as of 2004, and FYR Macedonia as of 
2005. The fast track EU membership for Iceland may also be underway in 
2009/10 along with Croatia which appears closest to reaching the EU member-
ship goal in the foreseeable future. The remaining Western Balkan countries - 
potential candidate countries although characterised by minor differences in dy-
namics of the achieved progress have the prospect of EU membership. Bearing 
that in mind and in view the commitment to adopt the euro being an integral part 
of the EU Accession Agreement for the future member states, the EMU is likely 
to significantly increase the number of members over the forthcoming period 
(Radović, 2007).  
 
 
2. Transition of the new EU Member States towards adopting the common 
currency 
 
Regarding the pace of transition of the new EU member states towards the euro, 
two tendencies are evident. The first regards the aspiration of some countries to 
adopt the euro as soon as possible (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2001; Rostowski 
and Dabrowski, 2006). This approach is based on an assessment that most of the 
new member states do meet the criteria for public debt, fiscal deficit, and central 
bank independence (ECB, 2008). Hence it is advocated that the current non-
compliance with the monetary convergence criteria, due to somewhat higher 
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inflation rates and long-term interest rates, is the result of global trends, and that 
the Maastricht Convergence Criteria are inadequate and incongruous transition 
mechanism of euro adoption given the nature of the present EMU enlargement 
(Dabrowski and Rostowski, 2006).  
The new EU Member States are open economies trading heavily with 
the old EU member states – The trade accounts for around 60% of their import 
and export (Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli, 2005). Therefore, a stable exchange 
rate is preferred, i.e. the adoption of the euro, as it had been the case with the 
current Eurozone member states. Remaining in the exchange rate mechanism 
ERM II may be considered optimal in short-and medium-term, but from the 
longer perspective, this may expose countries to financial crisis, akin to the one 
of 1992 (Angeloni, Ehrmann, 2003). 
Contrary to the view that the new EU member states should adopt the 
euro as soon as possible, other views point out that their fast transition towards 
the EMU calls for caution (Dabrowski and Rostowski, 2006). In countries cop-
ing with the fiscal consolidation, this will result in the contraction of economy, 
further leading to wages freeze and a consequent inability to follow the wage 
convergence within the Eurozone. The new member states are generally more 
exposed to risk given the heterogeneity of their economic structures in compari-
son with the Eurozone. It can be concluded that such countries need more ma-
noeuvring space within the public debt benchmark prescribed by the EMU fiscal 
framework, in order to achieve efficiency of fiscal policy in neutralising asym-
metric shocks. Attempts to abruptly reduce the structural deficit after joining the 
EU collide with the need of new member states to increase public investments in 
order to attain the EU level of development. CEECs countries need to finance 
new public investments and converge to EU income average, hence their com-
mitment to fiscal consolidation will certainly remain a difficult challenge.   
In general, a speedy transition of new member states towards the EMU 
could lead to a premature abandonment of monetary and exchange rate policies, 
and partly fiscal policy, which could in turn impair the quality of new member 
states’ real convergence process and structural reforms of their economies (An-
geloni, Flad, and Mongelli, 2005).    
 
 
3. The impact of enlargement on the ECB monetary policy 
 
Some of the expected effects of the EMU accession have already to a certain 
extent been materialised in the new member states. Notwithstanding expecta-
tions that the EMU accession itself would lead to increase in trade and invest-
ments (due to non-existent transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty), a 
number of new member countries are/were already de facto EMU members at 
the time of EU accession - some of them having currency boards or other forms Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union 
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of peg to the euro. Therefore, the increase in the volume of trade and invest-
ments associated with the monetary union, albeit expected, would not be impres-
sive.  
On the other hand, the EMU enlargement will certainly affect the mone-
tary policy decision-making through changes in the ECB Governing Council, 
both through increasing the complexity of the decision-making process and 
growing uncertainty with regard to shaping the optimal monetary policy for the 
enlarged monetary union.   
Some authors (Dabrowski and Rostowski, 2006) think that the impact of 
enlargement will be limited. Namely, by recognising the relative economic 
“weight” of new member states in the expanded Eurozone (estimated at around 
10 percent of the EU GDP), economic consequences of Central and Eastern 
European countries’ accession to the EMU ought to be limited. Furthermore, 
should generally higher inflation rates continue to persist in the new member 
states, due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, it is important to highlight that in 
such cases inflation is confined to non-tradable goods and would thus insignifi-
cantly contribute to inflation increase in other Eurozone countries.   
Nonetheless, should the ECB, bearing in mind the structural problems 
present in many of the new EU member states, decide to keep up with the cur-
rent monetary policy in the enlarged Eurozone,  it would lead to an increase in 
average unemployment rate in some of the new member states. The ECB would 
then have to consider the option of revising its target inflation rate upwards in 
order to avoid calling into question the enlarged Eurozone growth. The ECB – 
taking into account that the enlargement itself, with the previously explained 
risks, could contribute to generating structurally higher levels of inflation in the 
EMU - in accordance with the aforesaid, could also decide not to choose a more 
flexible approach in the monetary policy formulation. Thus, if structural reforms 
aimed at strengthening the supply in the EU-27 were to slow down, the ECB 
would have to opt for one of the two alternatives: 1) to completely adhere to the 
target inflation of below 2 percent and thus accept a long-lasting higher level of 
unemployment in the enlarged Eurozone or 2) to abandon the target value of 
inflation of below 2 percent in order to adapt itself to the needs of new member 
states. Both scenarios indicate the probability that the EMU will not see any se-
rious enlargement as long as there is no visible progress in new EU member 
states with regard to structural reforms and approaching the EU standards.  
 
 
4. Eurosystem and the decision-making in the enlarged EMU: changes in 
the ECB Governing Council  
 
CEEC economies are characterized by structural shocks different from those the 
old EU member states are exposed to. Large EMU member states like Germany Irena Radović 
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and France exhibit low or negative correlation with regard to supply and demand 
shocks that economies of new member states are exposed to (Fidrmuc and Kor-
honen, 2003). Moreover, some of the new countries have been experiencing high 
rates of growth and stronger inflationary pressures owing to, inter alia, the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect (Kenen i Meade, 2003).Therefore the new member 
states are likely to prefer different monetary policy with respect to current EMU 
members, thus exacerbating the existing problem that a single monetary policy 
does not fit all.  
Aiming to address a complex situation regarding the ECB monetary pol-
icy decision-making, once the number of the EMU member states exceeds 15, 
the European Council adopted a plan in 2003 (ECB, 2003). Changes to the deci-
sion-making rules of the ECB have undoubtedly been inevitable in order to cope 
with the enlargement of the Eurozone. Finding a solution for the institutional 
dimension of the EMU enlargement was among the most complex task bearing 
in mind that 24 members (the current 16 EMU members and the remaining new 
8 EU Member States outside the Eurozone yet legally obliged to adopt the euro 
with exceptions of Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) would call into 
question the balance between the ECB Executive Board and NCB governors 
sitting on the ECB Governing Council by shifting the balance towards the NCB 
governors. Prevailing national component in the decision-making on monetary 
policy of the ECB Governing Council, would likely affect an increase in infla-
tion expectations, either due to uncertainty arising from greater heterogeneity in 
managing structures or due to a possibility that monetary policy strategy could 
be perceived in line with national interests of a group of countries rather than the 
reflection of general interest of the EMU as a whole.   
In order to provide a timely solution for this challenge, the European 
Commission and the ECB Governing Council proposed a reform in 2003, sup-
ported by the European Council. The new arrangement envisaged that 6 ECB 
Governing Council members would retain full voting rights. As far as the re-
maining votes are concerned, rotation schemes were established, each to come 
into force progressively in accordance with increase in the number of Eurozone 
member states.   
According to the new system, NCB governors of larger member states 
will be a part of the ECB Governing Council and will exercise full voting rights 
more frequently than their counterparts from smaller EMU member states, 
whereas the number of NCB governors with voting rights in the ECB Governing 
Council would remain limited to 15 in order to ensure the strategic position of 
the ECB Executive Board in decision-making with regard to shaping and im-
plementing the single monetary policy.  Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union 
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4.1 Reform of the decision-making process in the ECB Governing Council 
in view of enlargement 
As prescribed by Article 107 of the Treaty, the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) is be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB – the 
Governing Council and the Executive Board. The ECB Governing Council con-
sists of 6 members of the ECB Executive Board and NCB governors of the EU 
Member States that have adopted the euro. Bearing in mind the prospect of fur-
ther EMU enlargement, without the reform the ECB Governing Council would 
have, in the medium-term, and through the growing presence of NCB governors, 
ended up with over 30 members. Against such backdrop, efficient and timely 
decision-making of the ECB Governing Council could have been challenged 
with regard to the quality of the decision making, from the perspective of the 
Eurozone average.  
Taking into account the possibility of unbalanced influence of coalitions 
of smaller states on the EMU decision-making process, with a view to “prepar-
ing the EU institutions for the Union enlargement”, Article 10 of the ECB Stat-
ute was amended in Nice in 2000 with regard to voting rights in decision-making 
of the ECB Governing Council
2. It was envisaged that the Commission and the 
ECB would prepare a proposal to be adopted by the European Council after con-
sulting the European Parliament. The reform was initiated in 2003 and the solu-
tion proposal was adopted and ratified in spring 2004.    
The reform of exercise of voting rights in the ECB Governing Council 
decision-making process was seen as an optimal solution in given circumstances 
and as a success in balancing conflicting positions. It was confirmed by the 
unanimous vote and prompt ratification by 15 member states. It limited voting 
rights to a number smaller than the actual number of members of the ECB Gov-
erning Council. The voting is established through asymmetric rotation that is 
developed progressively, taking different modalities with the progress of the Eu-
rozone enlargement. The asymmetry is reflected in division of NCB governors, 
first in two groups and then, with the EMU enlargement, in three groups. Gover-
nors will thus be part of different groups, subject to size of their economies’ ra-
tios in the Eurozone and the size of financial markets (Angeloni and Ehrmann, 
2003).  
Each group of countries is characterised by a certain number of allocated 
votes and within the group each governor may have the same voting frequency 
within as other governors in the same group. Although this is a complex solu-
tion, it has been evaluated that such a solution enables efficient functioning of 
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the ECB Governing Council ECB (Gros D., 2003). It’s most important features 
are that it preserves both the strategic position of the ECB Executive Board and 
participation of national governors in the decision-making process, in accor-
dance with economic weight of their respective states. At the same time, gover-
nors of national central banks (NCB) without voting rights are entitled to par-
ticipate in the discussion on monetary policy.  
 
4.2 Implementation of the ECB Governing Council decision-making process 
reform in two stages  
In order to ensure a smooth introduction of the rotation system in the ECB Gov-
erning Council decision making process and “pre-empt” the situation in which 
the “one member, one vote” principle would affect interests of the system as a 
whole in view of coalitions of smaller states, the project is established in two 
stages. Once the number of countries in the Eurozone reaches the level between 
16 and 21, the rotation system is designed to operate based on two rotation 
groups whilst when the Eurozone reaches 22 members, the system is based on 
three groups. Governors in each group hold the right to vote for equal periods of 
time. 
 
Table 1: Two-group rotation system (first stage) – voting frequencies of governors 
 
Number of governors in the 
Governing Council 
16 17 18  19 20  21  22  + 
1
st group: 
No. of voting rights/No. of 
governors 
Voting frequency 
 
5/5 
100% 
 
5/5 
100% 
 
5/5 
100% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
2
nd group: 
No. of voting rights/No. of 
governors 
Voting frequency 
 
10/11 
91% 
 
10/12 
83% 
 
10/13 
77% 
 
11/14 
79% 
 
11/15 
73% 
 
11/1
6 
69% 
IT 
GOES 
TO 
PHASE 
II  
Total 
number 
of votes 
15 
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, May 2003. 
 
During the first stage applicable on the monetary union consisting of 16 to 21 
member states, governors are allocated to two groups. The first group is com-
posed of governors from five strongest economies in the Eurozone (measured by 
the size of their GDP, i.e. their share in the aggregate GDP of the EU, and the 
size of their banking sector). The first group thus shares 4 or 5 votes depending 
on the number of EMU members (see Table 1). The second group is composed 
of all other NCB governors, representing smaller economies. The total number 
of national representatives - NCB governors - is  restricted to 15. As the table 
shows, the allocation of voting rights to the two groups is subject to change de-
pending on the dynamics of the Eurozone enlargement. Such approach ensures 
that the voting frequency of the NCB governors in the first group is in balance Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union 
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with the voting frequency of those in the second group and that it conforms with 
the economic strength of countries represented by the governors. 
The second stage comes into being as soon as the 22
nd member state 
joins the Eurozone. The voting system in the ECB Governing Council will oper-
ate on the basis of three groups, in which case, the first group would have 4 
votes (members of this group would be entitled to voting rights 80% of time); 
the second group that would be composed of half of EMU member states would 
have 8 votes; and the smallest economies would be entitled to 3 votes, i.e., their 
governors would vote between 37 and 50% of time depending on the size of 
EMU (see Table 2).  
Since representatives of the respective groups exercise their voting 
rights on the basis of the rotation system, “larger” states exercise this right more 
frequently than “smaller” member states, according to their economic power. 
Simultaneously, all member states, through NCB governors in the ECB Govern-
ing Council, have the right to participate in discussions on monetary policy and 
thus the EMU members without voting rights at the moment when the decision 
takes place contribute with their expertise and articulated views pertinent to 
forming of policies. Members of ECB Executive Board retain 6 voting rights, so 
that the total number of votes within the ECB Governing Council is maintained 
at 21, with the relative power being shifted towards the ECB Executive Board. 
 
Table 2: Three-group system (second stage) – Voting frequencies of governors 
 
Number of governors in the 
Governing Council 
16-21  22 23 24 25 26 27 
1
st group: 
No. of voting rights/No. of 
governors 
Voting frequency 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
 
4/5 
80% 
2
nd group:  
No. of voting rights/No. of 
governors 
Voting frequency 
 
8/11 
73% 
 
8/12 
67% 
 
8/12 
67% 
 
8/13 
62% 
 
8/13 
62% 
 
8/14 
57% 
3rd group: 
No. of voting rights/No. of 
governors 
Voting frequency 
 
 
 
PHASE I 
 
Total 
number 
of votes 
15  
3/6 
50% 
 
3/6 
50% 
 
3/7 
43% 
 
3/7 
43% 
 
3/8 
38% 
 
3/8 
38% 
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, May 2003. 
 
4.3 Complexity of monetary policy in the enlarged EMU  
EMU enlargement is an ongoing and dynamic process running parallel to the EU 
enlargement. The Eurozone has exceeded 15 countries with the entry of Slovakia 
in January 2009 and larger number of member states is expected to join EMU 
over the medium term.   
As already underscored, the vote rotation scheme in two stages is per-
ceived as an optimal solution in given circumstances and as a result of apprecia-Irena Radović 
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tion of conflicting positions of “larger” and “smaller” EU member states, both 
old and new. In practice, if one takes a look at a governor with a 5-year term as 
an example, depending on the size and economic weight of the country repre-
sented, once the number of Eurozone member states exceeds 21, such governor 
will have to abstain from voting for monetary policy formulation for one year (if 
it is a country in the first group), and for 1.35 or even 2.5 years if his country is 
in the second or third group.  
Evidently, the model of reform of the ECB decision-making process fa-
vours governors of larger member states and, as suggested by Chart 2, it points 
to a lack of symmetry between the economic importance of countries and roles 
that they will have with the Eurozone enlargement. In addition, it points to the 
lack of correlation between the economic power of countries and role of national 
governors in the decision-making process: in the second phase of the reform the 
first rotation group with economic weight of 74.63% is entitled to 4 votes in the 
ECB Governing Council, whilst the group of countries with a share of 24.21% in 
EU GDP is entitled to 8 votes. The last group of countries represents only 1.16% 
of EU GDP and governors in this group share 3 votes in the ECB Governing 
Council (Sebea, 2006).  
 
 
Chart 1: Distribution of Voting rights and Economic Size in EMU 
Source: Sebea (2006) 
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Chart 2: Economic ratio and number of votes per group of countries 
 
Source: Sebea (2006) 
 
Another negative aspect is that the new rotation system is not likely to signifi-
cantly increase the efficiency of the Governing Council since all NCB governors 
will be entitled to take part in the discussions on monetary policy and therefore 
increase the cost of decision-making. Over the short and medium term, that will 
is likely to become an obstacle since the Governing Council will grow in size 
significantly from 21 of today, to possibly over 30 members. In the hypothetic 
scenario presented in Chart 3 taking into account the current membership of the 
EU, with prospective 24 members of Eurozone, including Romania and Bul-
garia, up to 30 governors will are likely to participate in meetings of the ECB 
Governing Council in the medium term. 
One of the recommendations which would be a step forward in terms of 
overcoming aforementioned challenges, ensuring adequate monetary policy 
making and ultimately preventing the gap between old and new, “larger” and 
“smaller” EU member states has to do with further centralisation of EMU, 
through transfer of decision-making or part of decision-making to the ECB Ex-
ecutive Board. 
Inevitably, the implementation of reformed decision-making scheme in 
the ECB Governing Council has to do with qualitative changes that the reformed 
decision-making system will introduce with respect to the outcome of monetary 
policy design for Eurozone as a whole. In that regard particular attention must be 
paid to distinctive features of the new member states’ economies and the at-
tained level of convergence with Eurozone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Irena Radović 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Voting rights and Economic Size in EMU 
(hypothetical case  EMU 24) 
 
Source: Sebea (2006). 
 
5. Increased divergence of monetary transmission  
 
One of the most important enlargement-related challenges of monetary policy is 
associated with the fact that the new ECB Governing Board will be faced with 
increased heterogeneity of economic structures among prospective EMU mem-
ber states. Diverse structures of economy, industry, different banking systems, 
and different levels of centralisation of labour markets suggest that the monetary 
policy transmission will be more complex in comparison to the current EMU 16, 
where a dose of divergence in the transmission has been evident in the recent 
years (ECB, 2008; Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2003). Individual empirical studies 
(Ganev et al, 2002) indicate that the ECB monetary policy has asymmetric ef-
fects in countries aspiring towards EMU membership. This raises the question of 
what it means for the ECB monetary policy. 
With regard to the monetary policy in Eurozone, the more an individual 
country deviates from the average, the less adequate ECB policy will be defined 
to suit the Eurosystem and, accordingly, the higher the risk of output fluctuation 
and higher inflation rates in new member states may become. Accordingly, pro-
posals concerning the need to pay special attention to the countries deviating 
from average performance, where asymmetry in monetary policy transmission is 
more striking are gaining prominence (Gros and Hefeker, 2002, Benigno, 2004). 
This implies that problems in the transmission have been defined and that the 
central bank can influence them, which need not be the case in enlarged EMU or 
at least not immediately after the enlargement. In addition to asymmetric mone-
tary policy transmission, one might also expect uncertainty, given that the ECB Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union 
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cannot estimate the effects of monetary policy on real variables in new member 
states, in view of the restructuring process taking place in them (De Grauwe and 
Senegas, 2004). The usual response is weaker reaction of the central bank to 
economic shocks, which leads to a conclusion that ECB will lead less active 
monetary policy than it had been the case in the past.    
Over the previous period, the ECB was frequently criticised for its strat-
egy as being less responsive in comparison to the American Fed, but the reality 
is such that the design and implementation of monetary policy in Eurozone is far 
more complex than in the US, taking into account heterogeneity of economies of 
EMU members states in relation to other optimum currency areas. This chal-
lenge for ECB is gaining prominence with the EMU enlargement, and it is there-
fore expected that ECB will be more cautious in shaping the monetary policy.  
   In this context, one must also take into consideration other ramifications 
of a less active monetary policy on financial markets and private sector. Since 
monetary policy will not be available as an instrument of salary increase adjust-
ments in the enlarged Union, the trend pronounced in larger new member states 
that have not renounced on independent monetary policy yet, one could expect 
less aggressive approach of trade unions and more cautious approach of employ-
ers in forming salaries, which leads to positive effects with respect to lower ex-
posure of these economies to shocks (Hefeker, 2005; Posen and Gould, 2006). 
In addition to private sector, governments will need to adjust to growing 
uncertainty surrounding the responsiveness of ECB, in terms of increasing po-
litical will to implement structural reforms regarding the labour market (Hefeker, 
2006). With the loss of national monetary policy as an instrument for alleviating 
economic shocks, more space will need to be created for private sector, and the 
role of the government ought to be instrumental in terms of increasing flexibility 
of labour market and production in order to make economy less susceptible to 
shocks. With the loss of monetary policy, even the governments that may pay a 
significant political price for the reform of structural policies will be “forced” to 
pursue them, given that the growing uncertainty in the behaviour of ECB will 
stress the need for implementation of structural reforms of high quality.   
 
 
6. Growing uncertainty in the ECB’s actions  
 
Further to growing uncertainty related to ECB itself, the EMU enlargement and 
its impact on decision-making in Eurosystem entails uncertainty for financial 
markets and private sector. This had also been the case during the first years of 
EMU. Financial markets needed time to form adequate perception of the behav-
iour and response of ECB to economic developments (Goldberg and Klein, 
2005). In view of the EMU enlargement, the stress is on the fact that new mem-
ber states with differing preferences with respect to monetary policy have seats Irena Radović 
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on the ECB Governing Council, and as their number grows bigger, effects on 
monetary policy decisions will be changed in comparison to EU 15, given that 
systemically different preferences affect the median solution which determines 
the monetary policy (Hefeker, 2003).  
There are also opposing views that the ECB Governing Council cur-
rently takes decisions that are primarily in the interest of larger member states 
and that the current voting principle does not reflect the de facto distribution of 
power (Fatum, 2006). Furthermore, even some NCB analysts support highlight 
that the reform of the decision-making process in the ECB Governing Council 
contributes to uncertainty, despite a number of unknowns about the manner and 
quality of decision-making in the enlarged EMU (Servais, 2006).  
 
Conclusion   
 
An insufficient degree of political unification of the European Union has influ-
enced the birth of a unique institutional framework for the monetary policy in 
terms of functioning and accountability. Against such a backdrop the EMU 
enlargement process brings additional challenges: a) for the prospective Euro-
zone members - renouncing of national sovereignty as regards monetary policy, 
process of uncertain transition, particularly from the aspect of real convergence; 
b) for the current Eurozone members – increased heterogeneity and uncertainty 
related to accession of economies that have not been adjusted to the Eurozone 
average and c) for the ECB in terms of implementation of efficient monetary 
policy for 24 or more member states. 
Notwithstanding the prevailing view that the reformed decision-making 
in the ECB Governing Council reflects the relation of economic power and in-
fluence more “equitably”, one cannot neglect that the system favours governors 
of larger countries which can be seen a drawback given the initial design and 
nature of decision making. Additionally, the reform will not contribute to raising 
the efficiency of ECB because all NCB governors will be entitled to take part in 
deliberations without voting right and therefore increase the cost of decision-
making, which is not negligible considering the intensity of the Eurozone 
enlargement.   
Whilst findings regarding the impact of EU enlargement and reform of 
the ECB Governing Council decision-making on the EMU’s stability remain in 
the zone of speculation, there is a significant degree of agreement that underde-
velopment and insufficient degree of real convergence of the new member states 
with the Eurozone, and consequently significantly different interests in monetary 
policy designing, could ultimately result in a less active monetary policy of ECB 
and bring in a dose of uncertainty re quality and sustainability of the European 
monetary project. Challenges for Monetary Policy in the Enlarged European Monetary Union 
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It appears that further centralisation of monetary policy imposes itself as 
a sustainable and superior solution.  
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